It is expected that the implementation of the Caesar Act will have limited impact on foreign trade as exports and imports are at their minimum level. The implementation of the law and restrictions on trade with Syrian institutions may result in the 700 million USD in exports declining a few million dollars. In most of cases, the commodities exported are not covered by the law, and, for the most part, they are carried out by small-scale local producers who are unknown on the economic scene.
It is expected that the US Treasury Department will review one of the Caesar Act’s articles relating to the Central Bank of Syria, as the law stipulates that the activities of the Central Bank of Syria will be reviewed within 180 days of imposing the law, that is, by the end of 2020.  As such, the worst is yet to come for the Central Bank of Syria as due to European, Arab and American sanctions, the Central Bank of Syria will be a source of threat to any institution in the world that deals with it. The Central Bank also become unable to formally deal with even institutions in China and other countries that have no qualms dealing with it to finance food or medicinal goods. Until the beginning of 2021 and the release of the outcome of the review, the Central Bank will continue to be able to deal with countries, that accept to deal with it, at a minimum. The review is expected to argue for classifying the Central Bank as aiding the Syrian regime’s money laundering and war financing operations. The Central Bank faces a situation where it will not have an opportunity for growth to replenish its already eroded cash reserve in the next few years at least and securing foreign funds will become one of the main difficulties it faces. 
Although foreign partners maintain their stakes in private banks operating in Syria, as is the case in Al Baraka Syria, the Syria International Islamic Bank and others, it appears the sanctions imposed so far have not affected their branches outside Syria. It remains unclear whether the situation will continue like this. In the event of changes in this issue, it is expected that these institutions will exit from the market and they will sell their shares at some time in 2021 or later.
However, the Syrian banking system’s ability to support the activities of the Central Bank of Syria remains limited to handling minimum banking services. It is unlikely, especially due to the Caesar Act, for these services to expand any time soon.
On the budget level, the government’s ability to collect revenues and subsidize basic commodities has been affected. The 2021 budget prepared after the passage of the Caesar Act, accounted for the partial removal of subsidies on bread, industrial diesel and the price of gasoline, and it is expected that the investment projects approved in the budget will not be implemented except for those that are necessary to reduce the deficit.
There is no hope that salaries and wages will be increased proportionate to the rise in prices occurring in Syria, so the poverty rates will continue to increase in the coming period, and the government will not be able to influence it in any way, especially considering its inability to attract foreign capital and secure job opportunities. In the private sector, where salaries are relatively better than state salaries, the reconstruction operations have become a matter of the past due to the Caesar Act affecting possibilities for private sector growth or stimulus. 

Fifth: The implications of the Caesar Act on the Livelihood and Humanitarian Situation in Northern Syria
In the late quarter of 2020, the livelihood situation in northern Syria has deteriorated further as the decline in the exchange rate of the Pound fundamentally impacted the price of goods and services. Although conducting transactions in Turkish Lira slightly improved the situation of prices, noticeably decreasing prices, soon the Lira was also facing a crisis represented by the decrease in its price against the USD which reflected on the prices in northern Syria. These fluctuations are clear in the case of Idlib and the countryside of Aleppo, as the price of a bundle of bread rose from 300 Pounds in early 2020 to more than 750 Pounds in May 2020 to then decrease slightly after it was pegged to the Lira price; the price then return to approximately 400 Pounds. The price of a kilogram of rice also increased, rising from 650 Pounds per kilogram in early 2020 to 1600 Pounds May 2020 before stabilizing in November at around 1,500 Pounds. 
In the case of Deir ez-Zor and al-Raqqa (see Figure 3) which continued to conduct transactions in the Syrian Pound, prices remained stable until late June and then began to rise clearly. The price of a bundle of bread remained at 200 Pounds until July when it rose to 300 Pounds and settled at around 400 Pounds per bundle in November 2020. As for the price of rice, it rose from 750 Pounds per kilogram in early 2020 to 2,000 Pounds per kilogram in May. The price of rice witnessed this fluctuation as an imported good affected by the exchange rate. By November 2020, the price of a kilogram of rice had settled at 1,400 Pounds. It is necessary to note that the price of red and white meat remained cheaper than others until the end of 2020. The prices of commodities manufactured in Deir ez-Zor, al-Hasakah and al-Raqqa remained stable until the beginning of October 2020, when it appears that a large increase in demand resulted in a dramatic rise in prices. This increase in demand indicates that regime-controlled areas have begun to rely on these regions more than ever before.

Figure NO (3)

Figure NO (4)