In a speech to his new government on September 24, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad argued that transferring powers away from Damascus is a flawed conception of decentralization. The process, he said, should begin not with the distribution of powers to municipalities or directorates in the provinces, but with the development of local institutions before moving to the idea of transferring powers, the final stage of decentralization.

Assad’s comments came a month after his speech to the People’s Assembly on August 25, in which he declared that the executive branch was working diligently toward restructuring and redistributing powers and responsibilities. At the time, he said that administrative and economic reform projects could not succeed under extreme centralization, but that the country needed “more decentralization, especially for local administrative institutions.”

Assad’s speech directly contrasts with Law 107 of August 23, 2011, part of the so-called reform process announced by the regime following the outbreak of a revolution against his regime the previous March. In fact, the transfer of powers was the primary goal of the law, which stated that it aimed to “apply decentralization of authorities and responsibilities” and that “the role of the central authorities is limited to planning, legislation, and organization.” It also stipulated that central authorities would only be responsible for “implementing major projects that administrative units are unable to carry out.”    

During a Local Councils Conference on February 17, 2019, Assad described Law 107 as “an important step towards increasing the effectiveness of local administration by granting municipalities more independence and expanding the scope of administrative decentralization in managing the affairs of society.” He reinforced this concept by saying that “Practically speaking, it is no longer possible to manage the affairs of society and state in Syria or achieve balanced development using the same centralized methods that were prevalent in past decades.”

At the same conference, Assad distinguished between the type of decentralization he supports, as per Law 107, and the “comprehensive decentralization” he rejects, which he accused “think tanks in countries supporting terrorism” of promoting and attempting to implement in Syria. He explained his rejection by arguing that “comprehensive decentralization weakens the state’s authority entirely, marginalizes the state, reduces its sovereignty and national values, leads to the fragmentation of social cohesion, and ultimately results in the geographical division of the country.”

Despite this distinction, the regime’s suspicious attitude toward decentralization in general persisted, and was one reason why Law 107 has not been fully implemented, even 13 years after its enactment. The regime has worked diligently to remove the term “decentralization” and its associated concepts from the content of United Nations resolutions and statements, such as Security Council Resolution 2254, the Geneva Communiqué, and other international statements like the Vienna Communiqués. The regime also prevented the inclusion of the term in the “Twelve Living Principles"” issued by former UN envoy Staffan de Mistura on November 30, 2017 at the conclusion of the Geneva 8 negotiations, which later became one of the guiding frameworks for the Constitutional Committee after it was adopted in the final statement of the Russian-backed Sochi Conference, in early 2018.

Assad’s new stance on decentralization is seen as a complete rejection of the former policy, as decentralization without powers and authorities being delegated to local administrations is meaningless. This new stance can be interpreted as a preemptive move against the incorporation of decentralization into a “step-by-step” approach. It coincides with the meeting of the Civil Society Support Room under the office of the UN Special Envoy, which is working on an initiative related to “confidence-building measures,” in which decentralization is one of the main points of discussion.

This new stance could also signal the regime’s return to isolationism and its rejection of any initiative that it perceives might be imposed on it during its current phase of weakness, following the collapse in the strength of its two major supporters on the ground—Iran and Hezbollah—and Russia’s continued preoccupation with the war in Ukraine. This coincides with steady European and American support for sanctions on the Syrian regime. Assad expressed despair in front of his government over the chances of improving the economic situation through Arab engagement with the regime, which he described as being purely political in character and therefore incapable of rescuing the Syrian economy.