Syrians are keenly watching for indications of U.S. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy during his second term, which officially began on January 20. Coming in the wake of a complex regional war and the fall of the Assad regime, Trump’s policies will have a major impact on the Middle East, not least on Syria.

Syria’s many complexities did not end with the fall of president Bashar al-Assad, even if his regime was the greatest obstacle of all. Syria and its complexities are linked to the complexities of the region. As with previous administrations, it is these regional questions that the Trump team is likely to emphasize, with implications for its policies towards Syria, rather than paying the country special attention.

Early indications suggest that the incoming administration will focus on reinstating Trump’s first-term policy of maximum pressure against Iran and limiting the Islamic Republic’s regional influence, especially in Yemen and Iraq. Just the day after he was sworn in, Trump re-designated Yemen’s Iran-allied Houthi rebels as a foreign terrorist organization. His team was engaged in the Iraqi file even before Trump officially entered the White House, sending several letters to the Iraqi government demanding the integration of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the national army in order to rein in Iran’s freedom of maneuver in Iraq.

The general shape of Trump’s policies on Syria will be based on his priorities in the region. Syria is not at the top of that list, meaning he is likely to keep Washington’s intervention in the Syrian file to a minimum. This does not rule out some engagement in order to achieve certain goals, such as preventing a resurgence of Iranian influence there, or working on peace agreements aimed at preventing another war in the Middle East in order to allow him to focus on other priorities such as confronting China.

Washington’s approach to Syria will also be partly determined by Trump’s personal relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, meaning his administration will likely reduce the support provided to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). However, it may not agree to a military resolution to the Kurdish question, instead supporting the Kurdish component’s integration into the post-Assad Syrian state rather than it remaining distinct from the rest of the state, with the possible exception of certain counter-terrorism units.

U.S. forces may not withdraw from Syria completely, instead repositioning but maintaining several bases along the Syrian-Iraqi border. These will most likely include Al-Tanf in the Badia and Kharab al-Jir in Al-Hasakah, given their importance to U.S. policy toward Iraq.

With regard to its dealings with the new rulers in Damascus, the Trump administration will likely respond to regional efforts led by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Qatar to stabilize Syria. This may entail more waivers of Assad-era sanctions. That said, the removal of former Al-Qaeda affiliate Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham from the U.S. list of terrorist organizations and the lifting the sanctions completely will not come so easily. U.S. engagement will depend on the extent to which the administration in Damascus allows all of Syria’s communities to engage in political life, and its genuine engagement with Trump’s vision for the Middle East.

Trump is an unconventional figure, and it is difficult to predict his next steps. His administration may deal more positively with Damascus if the latter is able to work effectively to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State group. However, Trump is unlikely to pursue a very open policy towards the new Syrian government, given his and his team’s negative view of Islamist movements in general.