Understanding Putin’s Communications with Al-Sharaa
Vladimir Putin’s official website announced on March 20 that the Russian president had sent a letter to Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, expressing his support for efforts to stabilize the country as quickly as possible in order to ensure its sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity. He also affirmed the Kremlin’s continued willingness to cooperate practically with the Syrian authorities across the full spectrum of bilateral relations, in order to strengthen the traditionally friendly relations between Russia and Syria.
The letter was the second direct communication between the two presidents since Al-Sharaa led the offensive that toppled longtime Russia ally Bashar al-Assad last December. Putin had a telephone call with al-Sharaa on February 12, delivering similar messages, stressing the importance of efforts to achieve a sustainable stability and promote intra-Syrian dialogue, with the participation of key political, ethnic and religious groups.
Putin aside, however, senior Russian officials have strongly criticized the new government in Syria. As Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in an interview on March 12, “I hope there will be national unity in Syria, but the situation so far is very dangerous.”
A day earlier, Lavrov had made another statement expressing Moscow’s concern for the peace and security for all political, ethnic, and religious groups in Syria, referring to the mass killings in the coastal region. He said he had met Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani during his visit to Turkey on February 23 and 24, stressing that Russia supports national reconciliation and an inclusive political process, and saying that all necessary guarantees had been provided by the Syrian side.
Putin’s latest message also came after Russia failed to secure the United Nations Security Council’s condemnation of the Syrian government and hold it responsible for the events. At the session, convened by Russia and the U.S. on March 10, Russia’s permanent representative to the UN, Vasily Nebenzia, launched a fierce attack on Syria’s new leaders, warning of the rise of jihadists in Syria and comparing the sectarian killing of Alawites to the genocide in Rwanda.
Nebenzia criticized Syria’s “new Islamist rulers” for their dissolution of the Syrian army and their massive public sector job cuts, warning of a repeat of the scenario of Iraq after 2003, and arguing that these moves had created a “corrupt foundation” for a political transition. He also expressed Russia’s concern at the dangerous role of foreign “terrorist” fighters.
Despite the apparent Russian-American rapprochement during the Security Council session, and the emergence of an opposing European position championed by permanent members France and Britain, Russia appears to have become convinced that there is a reluctance to condemn the new regime—a flipping of the script after years of Moscow blocking condemnation of Bashar al-Assad's regime.
Notably, the Russian president’s message comes just days after the Brussels 9 donor conference held on March 17, which for the first time invited the Syrian government, represented by Shaibani. In their statement, the conference’s co-chairs condemned regime remnants’ attacks on security forces. The European Union also voiced its support for steps taken by the Syrian government, which European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described as very encouraging, citing the signing of the Constitutional Declaration and the agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Shortly after the gathering, on March 20, Germany reopened its embassy in Damascus, with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock in attendance, on her second visit to Syria since the fall of the regime.
Given these positive signs from Europe, it appears that Russia wants to avoid losing Syria to the EU, especially given the presence of European voices calling for the closure of Assad-era Russian military bases, and the fact that Syria will remain a key arena of competition with the Europeans, even once Russia resolves its Ukraine dilemma.
In fact, Russian messaging on the new government in Syria appears conflicted, as the Kremlin’s final position on the situation in Syria has yet to be determined. Russia is however applying pressure to obtain concessions from the Syrian side on numerous issues, such as Russian bases, foreign fighters, economic interests and investments, and discouraging demands for the extradition of Bashar al-Assad or compensation for damage caused by Russia’s 2015 military intervention.
Finally, despite these conflicting policies, it is not impossible that Russia, the EU, and Arab and other states take a joint position backing the new government in Syria, to support domestic stability and peace, thus resolving some of the problems related to the Syrian issue, most notably the refugee issue. An obvious exception is Israel, which would maintain its categorical rejection of Syria’s rulers and continue its military operations in parts of southern Syria.