On January 29, the new Syrian administration held a conference heralding “the Victory of the Syrian Revolution”. It was attended by the commanders of the country’s armed factions—with the exception of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—as well as prominent officials in the new administration. Many gave brief speeches; most prominent was that of Syria’s de facto president Ahmed Al-Sharaa, who laid out the administration’s immediate priorities:

• Filling the power vacuum.

• Maintaining civil peace.

• Building state institutions.

•  Working to build and develop the economy.

• Restoring Syria’s international and regional standing.

The outcomes of the conference were presented by the spokesman for the Military Operations Administration, Colonel Hassan Abdulghani. Aside from announcing that December 8, the date former president Bashar al-Assad fled the country, would be a national day.

Abdulghani also announced the following:

• The abolition of Syria’s 2012 constitution and the suspension of all exceptional laws.

•  The dissolution of the People’s Assembly and its committees.

• The dissolution of the former regime’s army, and the establishment of a new army on a national basis.

• The dissolution of all the former regime’s security agencies with their various branches and names, along with all the militias it had      established, followed by the formation of a security institution to protect Syrian citizens.

• The dissolution of the Arab Socialist Baath Party, the member parties of the National Progressive Front bloc, and their affiliated  organizations, institutions and committees, which are banned from reconstituting under other names.

• The dissolution of all armed factions, political and civilian revolutionary bodies, and their merger into state institutions.

• Al-Sharaa’s appointment as Syria’s interim president, empowered to act as leader of the Syrian Arab Republic and represent it in  international forums, and authorized to form a Temporary Legislative Council for the transitional phase, until a permanent constitution  for the country is approved and enters into force.

The priorities Al-Sharaa laid out cannot be achieved under the circumstances that preceded the administration’s creation. The new government urgently needs the legislative and executive authority that would stem from a firm constitutional and legal foundation. Accordingly, the administration is moving from holding meetings and exchanging messages to more effective activity at the domestic level, signing understandings and agreements that have external legitimacy among its allies and supporters.

The new Syrian administration already achieved its first priority, that of filling the power vacuum, simply by holding the conference. It gave itself official powers to extend its authority across the entire country and to consolidate domestic security and stability. This will help maintain civil peace and start to build state institutions on legal and constitutional foundations, in cooperation with the new administration’s regional allies.

All such decisions were originally supposed to come via a General National Congress, but the new administration appears to have realized the difficulty  holding one, as each component would struggle to form a comprehensive national delegation to represent it. Moreover, there has been no agreement with the Kurdish-dominated Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. On the other hand, Syria’s armed former opposition factions have already reached an deal to dissolve themselves and merge into the new army, a step deemed sufficient to justify holding the conference, given the resulting decisions and moves towards achieving Al-Sharaa’s priorities.

Another factor that precipitated the conference was related to the mission of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to Syria, who briefed the Security Council from Damascus in a closed session on January 30. The Syrian administration believes that the tasks of the Special Envoy and the UN in general regarding Syria have ended, and that were he to continue in his mission regarding the constitution or elections, this would constitute interference in Syria’s internal affairs, in violation of the principle of state sovereignty. This explains the conference’s keenness to announce the dissolution of all political revolutionary bodies, which include the Syrian negotiating committee at UN-backed talks.

Furthermore, delaying the “Victory Conference” could have further complicated matters on the ground in Syria, leading to more armed anarchy and insecurity, and encouraging political and armed actors to resist integration under the new government’s authority or to demand special conditions, on the ground or constitutionally. It would also have let foreign countries aligned to certain local parties incite them against the administration, for their own reasons, and impose arbitrary conditions upon it.

For now, the conference enables the new government to sign deals with friendly countries, whether security and military partnerships or economic development and investment agreements. Later, it will be able to enter into regional and international partnerships to maintain regional security and combat terrorism, as well as domestic understandings to achieve the powers it needs to rebuild the Syrian state and all its institutions, contributing to improving livelihoods and enhancing stability across the country.