The signature of the United States was conspicuously absent from the final statement of the International Conference on Syria, held in Paris on February 13 at the initiative of the French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Jean-Noël Barrot.  

The conference concluded with a joint statement issued by the new government of Syria along with Western powers, including the European Union and the United Kingdom, several Arab states and Türkiye. The United Nations’ Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to Syria and the heads of both the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council also signed.  

The U.S. attended the Paris conference as an observer, with a reduced diplomatic delegation compared to its presence, headed by then-Secretary of State Antony Blinken, at the meeting in Aqaba, Jordan on December 14, 2024, just a week after the toppling of the Assad regime. The Biden administration also sent a significant delegation to the Riyadh meeting on January 12, 2025, headed by Under-Secretary of State John Bass.  

The statement from the Paris Conference, like those issued in Aqaba and Riyadh, expressed support for the Syria’s transitional government and the signatories’ desire to work together to ensure a peaceful, reliable, orderly, rapid and comprehensive transitional process, drawing on the spirit of Security Council Resolution 2254 of 2015, and aimed at forming a government representing all elements of Syrian society.  

The statement called on the transitional government to formulate a realistic, clear and transparent timetable and to commit to carrying out constitutional reforms, and to organize free and fair elections when the conditions are ripe. It also emphasized the importance of the UN’s role in supporting the transitional phase, and the efforts of the world body’s envoy Geir Pedersen in this regard.  

Anticipating that Washington’s absence could have negative impacts, French President Emmanuel Macron took part in the discussions in person, holding a bilateral meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani and confirming the invitation to Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa to visit France.  

Barrot, in his opening speech at the conference, voiced his country’s hope that the event would result in a joint statement, and vowed that if that were not possible, he would issue a statement in his own name, as president of the conference. Thus, Paris considered the conference to some extent a success, as it had not initially expected to produce a statement that was accepted unanimously—with the exception of one participating country.  

While the U.S. abstained from signing the statement, this did not imply an outright rejection of its contents; all of the signatories are U.S. allies. The reason was the addition of a new item, not been included in the Aqaba and Riyadh statements, stating that the signatories “acknowledge and support the Syrian transitional government in their existing commitment to upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms for all Syrians.”  

That could have been considered a green light and an implicit approval of recognition of the Syrian government. Paris ascribed the U.S. absence to “the lack of a specific American policy towards Syria to date,” arguing that the new Trump administration was still formulating its stance on the country post-Assad.  

The U.S. delay in recognizing the transitional government is also linked to a set of sanctions laws against the Syrian state. Recognition would require the review or repeal of these laws, as well as the removal of terror classifications against a number of top Syrian officials. It may also be linked to whether the country’s leaders fulfil their promises to see through a political transition that meets the aspirations of all Syrians, the demands of world powers, and other issues related to pledges to combat terrorism, ensure the security of neighboring countries, and prevent the production and trafficking of drugs.  

That said, Washington has not obstructed international recognition of the transitional government, unlike its previous approach to countries that had moved towards normalization with the Assad regime. The U.S. had kept a firm position that it would not normalize with the regime, nor encourage others to do so, and that it would punish any country violating U.S. sanctions against the regime.  

American recognition, then, is a matter of time—but time could be long, as Syria is not a priority or even of particular interest to the Trump administration.  

According to the final report of the Syria Study Group, jointly commissioned by the Democratic and Republican parties and submitted to Congress in 2019, the importance of Syria to the U.S. stems from five key threats: the risk of terrorist attacks; the risk of Iran igniting a wider regional conflict and opening a front from Syria against Israel; Syria being considered a strategic victory for Russia, making it a competitor to the U.S. in the Middle East; the destabilizing political and social effects on neighboring countries due to the ongoing exodus of refugees fleeing the regime’s violence; and the erosion of the credibility of the U.S. due to the regime’s flagrant violation of the basic international standards that the U.S. defends.  

With the fall of the Assad regime, the declining threat of terrorist attacks, the rolling back of the Iranian threat after the defeat of its allies in the region, Russia’s strategic defeat in Syria, and the beginning of the return of Syrian refugees, the country has slipped down the list of U.S. priorities.  

One issue that does remain prominent is that of the prisons and camps in northeastern Syria, which the Trump administration has begun to argue are not its responsibility alone, but rather a collective responsibility, especially for countries with citizens detained there.  

In conclusion, there are unlikely to be any negative repercussions from the U.S. refraining from signing the Paris Conference statement, nor from its delay in recognizing the Syrian transitional government. Given that it did not block other countries from extending their recognition, it is likely to behave flexibly by offering exemptions from some sanctions and suspending others, and in terms of international support for the Syrian economy, contributing to improving living standards and stabilizing the country.