Considering the "Syrian Democratic Council" Call for Holding Dialogue with the Syrian Coalition

Considering the "Syrian Democratic Council" Call for Holding Dialogue with the Syrian Coalition

In Focus | Considering the "Syrian Democratic Council" Call for Holding Dialogue with the Syrian Coalition
September 20th, the "Syrian Democratic Council" (SDC) called on the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces to participate in the dialogue, taking account that such negotiations should be according to the criterion of equality between the two parties and disregarding to the international recognition that the Syrian coalition holds.
However, such a call by the SDC could be considered in accordance with the political and international variables, and specifically in light with the timing of the statements:
1- It has become apparent through steps taken by each of the "Syrian Democratic Forces" )SDF( and )SDC( that there is a clear worry about having a tragic end that would be similar to the fate of the government of “Ashraf Abdul Ghani” in Afghanistan, which did not respond to any voice that was calling for being open to the “Taliban” movement and the other components, as a result of the euphoria brought about by the international and American support in particular. Consequently, the Ashraf Abdul Ghani-led government had found itself standing in front of the US troops withdrawal under considerations assessed by Washington alone.
2- The call by the Syrian Democratic Council came a few days after a delegation from its own members had visited Moscow and held talks on the future of northeastern Syria, and it is very likely that SDC wants to capitalize on such calls for dialogue with the opposition and use them against the Syrian regime and Russia just to get a bargaining chip in the ongoing negotiations between the two parties in order to achieve the highest possible gains.
Ilham Ahmed, the co-chair of the SDC, had previously called for holding a dialogue with the Syrian opposition in early 2021, in conjunction with the negotiating sessions she was conducting with the Syrian regime.
3- It is not unlikely that the SDC will accept to reach an understanding with the Syrian Coalition and the military opposition that operates under its political cover, provided that there is “American-Turkish” sponsorship, and that this understanding achieves the SDF minimum interests, which is the recognition of a decentralized system of governance, as each of the SDF and SDC realize that Russia cannot be trusted, as the latter will use them as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Turkish side, and therefore SDF prefers to achieve its own project without having to be enforced to get a relationship with Russia.
Overall, these calls may be practically difficult to implement, as the PKK is in control of the military and field decisions in northeastern Syria, and it will most likely prevent any attempt to converge with the spectra of the Syrian opposition for special accounts, and for the benefit of some international parties. Actually, the aforementioned party has not previously accepted the entry of the "Syrian Peshmerga" forces to its areas of control, which will be countered by the lack of willingness of both the Syrian opposition and Ankara for taking part in dialogue sessions; because they will see that useless.

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