On August 28, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad chaired a meeting of the Baath party’s central leadership. It was the second such publicly announced meeting since the election of the party’s new leadership in April, and following polls for the People’s Assembly in July. It also came after a lengthy speech Assad had delivered before the Assembly on August 25.

It is thus clear that the Syrian president is working to activate the party system in order to demonstrate, domestically and abroad, that he still controls Syria’s political life and has enough support to lead the country.

The Syrian regime does not usually publicize meetings of its leadership unless it has a particular message it wants to send to the public. In the past, it has made do with summoning party leaders to the presidential palace to give them instructions. The move must therefore be viewed in light of Assad’s efforts to prepare the party system for upcoming elections.

A number of decisions were passed at the meeting that appear to be aimed at reforming how the party is governed internally, but in practice prepare Syria’s political life for Assad’s planned constitutional amendments after he successful exploited the situation beyond Syria’s borders to end any attempt to prevent him from ruling indefinitely.

These decisions include the establishment of an internal system for the Central Committee that defines its tasks and relationship with the central leadership; the party bloc at the People’s Assembly adopting a role in amending the Assembly’s internal system; and the establishment of a financial system for the party that ensures control and financial responsibility over its resources and budget.

Assad wants to show that he has a new agenda for political and party affairs, as well as a desire to boost its new leadership as he works to revive the party, restoring it to its previous political role as the political façade of the regime. The meeting also approved the establishment of an internal system outlining new official tasks for the Central Committee, which includes 94 leaders who won their places through party elections.

By ordering the Baathist bloc in the People’s Assembly to amend the latter’s internal system, he wants to revive the role of the Assembly. In recent speeches has portrayed amending that system as a goal in and of itself—as if the problem with Syria’s political system lies in its legal texts and not in the behavior of its authorities.

Assad’s moves to push the party to adopt a new financial system regulating its extensive resources are aimed to demonstrate his control over the party, especially in the wake of leaks over scandals and financial violations by the previous central leadership. This even forced the new leadership to issue a statement on August 2, the first time that Assad has ever publicly acknowledged financial corruption in a party in power for more than 60 years.

Assad is working to rearrange the various elements of the regime and achieve a balance between them, as well as addressing and restoring the role of the party rank and file as he tries to give the impression that political life has returned to Syria. During periodic meetings in August, he asked Syria’s ambassadors and diplomatic heads to adopt the messaging that the regime has regained its balance, put its internal affairs in order, begun reforming its administrative structures, is awaiting reconstruction aid (providing this is not contingent on a political transition or the return of refugees), and offers plentiful investment opportunities. These moves will pave the way for the regime to pass new laws strengthening the People’s Assembly and preparing it for the additional role that Assad wants it to play in the coming years.

As the regime continues its normalization with Arab governments following its return to the Arab League, and the possibility of a Turkish normalization grows, the regime is hoping the European Union will also re-evaluate its own policy towards Damascus. It also hopes it will reap the rewards of rehabilitation after the Gaza war. Its approval of a package of decisions, portrayed as reforms—especially “amending the political system” by redefining the Baath party’s relationship with the executive—Assad may soon move to amend the 2012 constitution in order to expedite the desired gains from all these moves.

In fact, if Assad’s efforts to undermine the United Nations’ Constitutional Committee fail, he may pass any such constitutional amendment via that committee, thus reducing the entire political process and a string of UN resolutions to a mere constitutional reform. Assad likely prefers to formulate a single constitutional amendment, which he supervises and presents to the international community as an alternative to implementing UN resolutions, arguing that in doing so he has responded to the ongoing international demands to amend his regime’s behavior.

Assad’s ostensible reforms aim to demonstrate his ability to return the country to the way it was before 2011—even to the point of amending the constitution to rid it of the restrictions he had introduced in the 2012 constitution, which would end his presidential term in mid-2028. Article 88 only allows him to run for two terms, a reform that in 2012 was an attempt to circumvent the protest movement, portrayed by the regime as a political reform in response to popular demands.