Reviewing the local and international developments that occurred in Syria in 2022 makes it seems like that 2023 does not bring major changes in the scene, with the exception of some repercussions resulting from the tense relations between international actors.
More than two months have passed since Türkiye launched the "claw-sword" military air operation against the PKK and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Obviously, the level of escalation decreased 3 weeks after its announcement, which was on November 19, 2022.
During 2022, the Syrian opposition maintained its areas of control in northern and southern Syria without any new changes at the expense of the Syrian regime forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). However, on the other hand, some changes occurred in the map of internal influence within the areas controlled by the factions, specifically in northwestern Syria.
An Emirati delegation headed by the United Arab Emirates foreign minister, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Al Nahyan on January 4, 2023 made a visit to the Syrian capital, Damascus, and met the head of the Syrian regime, Bashar al -Assad. This visit is the second to Syria after the return of diplomatic relations between the two parties late 2018.
On January 14, 2023, the Head of the Syrian regime issued Decree No. 2 of 2023 regarding that regulates the affairs of the children of unknown parentage.
On January 12, 2023, the Turkish forces targeted a joint location of the Syrian regime forces, Iranian militias, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the town of "Al-Mayassa" of the Nubul district, which is located near the lines of contact with the city of Afrin, north of Aleppo.
An analytical report released by the Jusoor Center for Studies monitors the various stages that the Syrian issue went through during 2022, politically, militarily and economically. The report addresses the political process, the movements of the Astana track, the UN Security Council meetings on Syria, the policies of international actors, and others.
A map is released by the Jusoor Center for Studies monitors the reality of control ratios between the local forces in Syria by the end of 2022, as it shows the absence of any change in the influence of the Syrian opposition, the Syrian regime forces, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
In 2013, Israel started launching air strikes on Syria, which fall within the strategy of the "Campaign between Wars (CBW)"; where it considers it necessary to weaken the capabilities of the enemy (Iran and its militias or military units) and respond to threats outside the borders.
The Syrian regime attached great importance to the army. It took the slogan “No sound is louder than the battle's one” as an instrument for harnessing all the material and human capabilities to serve the effectiveness of the army's operations in order to maintain its control over the country's areas. The regime also works hard to take advantage of the above-mentioned slogan to serve its regional a
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a unique model for gaining resources; where it relied earlier on "spoils" and what was confiscated from its opponents. When these resources dried up, HTS moved towards smuggling and jumble sale. However, as soon as the above-mentioned resource ended up, Tahrir al-Sham began trading goods and controlling crossings.
The Syrian regime announced granting the license to a third cell phone operator in February 2022. Although the Syrian regime's government confirmed that the operating company is completely local under the name “Wafa Telecom”, an investigation in December revealed that the license was granted to a Malaysian company owned by an officer in the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
