On July 31, Syrian security forces intervened to break up protests in the town of Ain Minin, near Damascus, after angry residents blocked the drilling of a well by Syria’s public drinking water authority. 

The demonstrators were protesting at demands to drill additional wells on their land to meet the needs of neighboring areas, even as harsh rationing in Ain Minin itself means residents receive tap water just once a week. They are demanding that the authorities implement of Article 24 of a 2005 water law, which prioritizes securing water for drinking and basic human needs above all other uses.

The incident highlights the acute water security crisis facing Syria, whose impacts are extending beyond basic services and environmental aspects, to threaten the very fabric of the country’s social and economic stability. The crisis stems from the conjunction of both immediate pressures and structural factors; they include the destruction caused by Syria’s years of war, which officials say has damaged more than 60% of its water infrastructure, in addition to a number of pumping stations and water facilities being out of service, along with high rates of leakage from in water networks and waste resulting from the use of traditional irrigation methods. 

These factors have been exacerbated by severe climate change in the form of declining and irregular precipitation, which over the 2024-2025 winter was about 60% below the annual average, according to official estimates. This was reflected in low reservoirs, weak groundwater recharge, and poor agricultural production.     

Thirsty for Regulation     

The crisis is not entirely due to climatic conditions or the effects of war. Unregulated digging of wells and mismanagement of water resources has played a major role; with the fall of the Assad regime and the restructuring of state institutions, some have taken advantage of poor regulation to drill wells on their land, for various purposes.

The phenomenon of illegal wells is not new, but has been exacerbated by weak oversight and instability. It is no longer limited to agricultural projects, but has extended to include residential areas, as their inhabitants seek out drinking water. The spread of solar energy systems has facilitated the operation of a number of these wells for longer hours, increasing the pressure on underground reserves. 

The number of unlicensed wells in the Rif Dimashq region alone is estimated at about 50,000, compared to about 14,500 licensed wells. Many also lack regulation and oversight of their locations, depths, pumping rates, or operating hours, which has led to the depletion of groundwater reserves, a decline in the outflow from springs, and some drinking water wells going out of service. This has placed the water crisis in a vicious cycle: water shortages force residents and farmers to dig more wells; the proliferation of wells and increased pumping leads to the depletion of groundwater reserves and the decline of public springs and wells; this further exacerbates shortages, and so on.

The upshot is that Syria is seeing a worsening crisis in its drinking water supply, especially in Damascus and its hinterland, where the vital Ain al-Fijah spring, which provides a major part of the needs of the capital and its surroundings, is flowing at a significantly lower rate than previously. This has prompted the General Corporation for Water to roll out rationing in various regions. In an attempt to address these challenges, the General Company for Water and Sanitation in Damascus is implementing a broad program to rehabilitate water facilities in a number of areas, including networks, wells, tanks, pumping and desalination stations, with the aim of increasing service efficiency and enhancing the sustainability of drinking water supplies.  

However, the tension in the town of Ain Menin reveals that the water crisis is not only the result of a shortage of resources and supplies, but it is also a crisis of management, trust, and justice in distribution between the regions. Managing this issue has become a key challenge facing the Syrian government. The failure to provide drinking water and irrigation affects agriculture, food security, income, and job opportunities, directly affects the most vulnerable social groups, and may turn into a driver of protests and conflict. 

The economic repercussions of the crisis are evident through the direct relationship between water scarcity and the decline in agricultural production. The lack of irrigation water leads to a shrinkage of cultivated areas and a decrease in crop production, leading to farmers losing their sources of income, rising food prices, and increasing dependence on imports. The decline in agricultural activity also prompts more residents to leave the countryside in search of job opportunities and services in cities, which increases pressure on housing, infrastructure, and public services and deepens the development imbalance between regions.  

In this context, the drought that began in 2006 and continued for several years, in conjunction with mismanagement of resources and agricultural policies, damaged large areas of agricultural land and displaced tens of thousands of rural families to cities and their environs. Drought, declining livelihoods, and unemployment contributed to the increase in economic and social fragility that preceded the outbreak of the revolution against the Assad regime in 2011, in addition to more direct political and economic factors, most notably repression, corruption, mismanagement, and the absence of developmental justice.     

Time for a National Strategy     

The roots of the problem lie in the lack of an effective national water strategy for integrated resource management. The General Authority for Land and Sea Ports issued a circular in August 2025 prohibiting the entry of well rigs by land, sea or air without obtaining prior approval from the Ministry of Energy. Yet controlling the import of drilling rigs is not sufficient on its own to address the phenomenon. This also requires organizing the work of the excavators located inside the country, auditing wells, installing pumping meters, and linking well operations to a rigorous licensing and oversight system that accounts for the natural recharge capacity of each aquifer. 

Water management is also linked to unbalanced spatial development and population pressure resulting from displacement; this necessitates promoting modern irrigation systems and selecting crops suited to the water resources available in each region. Furthermore, efforts should be expanded to treat and reuse wastewater from agriculture and industry, maintain transmission and distribution networks to minimize losses, and implement water harvesting and aquifer recharge projects. 

Establishing seawater desalination plants along the Syrian coast could be considered, as a long-term strategic option, subject to an assessment of energy and transport costs as well as economic and environmental feasibility. 

Crisis management also requires establishing an institutional and legal framework capable of implementing consumption rationalization policies. This involves adopting a tiered pricing structure that safeguards the basic volume of water essential for life while charging the true cost for high or non-essential consumption, alongside encouraging the use of low-flow household fixtures and facility equipment.   

Local communities should be engaged and involved in decisions regarding the utilization of water basins and inter-regional water transfers. Additionally, data on water reserves, consumption, and wells must be published transparently, and clear mechanisms established for lodging objections and resolving water disputes before they escalate into security tensions. 

Finally, Syria’s water crisis is regional in nature. The country relies heavily on shared water basins and transboundary rivers—most notably the Euphrates, the Orontes (Asi), and the Yarmouk basin—meaning that Syria’s water security is inextricably linked to understandings with neighboring countries. A stable future for the region is inconceivable without reaching solutions and understandings based on the fair and sustainable sharing of water, economic stability and growth, and transboundary cooperation.     

Ultimately, there is a need for a new vision for water resource management—starting at the national level by treating water as a fundamental right and a finite public resource that must be managed with fairness and transparency, and extending to the regional level through cooperation in managing shared basins and rivers. Water is not merely an economic commodity subject to the laws of supply and demand; it is a fundamental human right and an indispensable necessity for life.     

Any national water strategy must ensure that all citizens have access to the quantities of water essential for life. It must distinguish between basic water needs—which require protection and support—and secondary or recreational uses, which could be subjected to tiered pricing and market mechanisms. Furthermore, water policies must account for the disparities between rural and urban areas, as well as between relatively water-rich basins and the regions most vulnerable to scarcity.     

Preventing water scarcity from escalating into a source of conflict and social unrest requires more than just increasing supplies; it demands transparent and equitable resource management. Such management must prioritize drinking water, involve local communities in decisions affecting their water basins, and strike a balance between the fundamental right to water and the requirements of agriculture and development. Water justice is an integral part of social justice and a prerequisite for achieving economic and social security, as well as sustainable development.