Since the collapse of the Assad regime, relations between Syria and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG) have evolved markedly, with a string of official meetings and exchanges. The August 3 visit of KRG President Nechirvan Barzani to Damascus was the most tangible manifestation yet of this improvement in relations.  

Communications between Syria’s new rulers and Barzani have been generally constructive, including during armed confrontations in early 2026 between Syrian government forces and the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—as Erbil helped support de-escalation efforts and maintain channels of communication between the parties. Damascus has repeatedly declared its solidarity with the KRG in the face of attacks by Iran and its Iraqi allies, bolstering mutual trust and further strengthening bilateral ties.  

Barzani’s visit has significant implications. It comes amid rapidly unfolding regional developments, notably the persistent signs of a renewed confrontation between the U.S. and Iran, and escalating tensions between Iran’s Iraqi allies and neighboring states—including Syria. Additionally, the visit comes as U.S. forces redeploy out of the region, including a significant reduction of their presence in Erbil, despite the ongoing Iranian threats and attacks against the KRG.  

In the domestic Syrian context, Erbil appears to be seeking to solidify the gains secured by Syria’s Kurdish community, transforming the presidential decree issued in early 2026—which granted Kurds citizenship and certain cultural rights—into permanent constitutional guarantees. This objective is particularly significant given Iraqi Kurdish anxieties over the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria and Iraq; Washington had played a pivotal role in mediating and underwriting understandings regarding Kurdish rights.  

The KRG also seems intent on capitalizing on rising tensions between the Syrian government and certain semi-official Iraqi entities, particularly factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Erbil has been increasingly suspicious of the rapprochement between Baghdad and Damascus, as well as proposed oil transport projects that could conflict with Iraqi Kurdish interests, in the shadow of the regional government’s disputes with Baghdad over oil sector management and revenue sharing.  

The KRG views Syria as an influential regional actor capable of curbing Iranian influence, particularly given that Damascus remains a key arena of conflict. In mid-July 2026, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced it had attacked    a U.S. special operations ​command center in Al-Tanf, eastern Syria, underscoring the persistence of this confrontation. The shared Iranian threat facing both Syria and the KRG is a key factor driving them to strengthen political and security coordination.  

From a broader regional perspective, Erbil’s positive stance toward Damascus could serve to reassure the latter’s allies, helping in turn to bolster the KRG’s relations with various key actors. This is particularly significant at a time when Erbil needs to expand its political and security options to counter Iranian threats, especially given the full U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, slated to be completed by September 2026.  

In summary, the KRG’s outreach to Syria is driven largely by the political and security considerations of the moment, rather than representing a fundamental shift in the nature of the relationship itself. Meanwhile, Damascus is likely to maintain a balanced diplomatic policy toward Iraq, preserving ties with the central government in Baghdad while continuing its engagement with Erbil. Damascus will continue to send positive signals to the Kurdish community affirming support for their rights—albeit within the framework of a unified Syrian state—thereby striking a balance between domestic political imperatives and regional diplomatic calculations.